Published by Truthout at: http://www.truth-out.org/fantastic-drone-technology-comes-rescue-border/1327519604
Candice
Miller, the Republican chair of the House Border and Marine Security
Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee, is effusive in her
praise of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), referring to the drones at a March
15, 2011, hearing on Capitol Hill as "fantastic technology" that have
proved "incredibly, incredibly successful in theater."
As the
new chair of the subcommittee that oversees the air operations of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), Miller has become one of the leading Congressional
advocates of increased domestic drone deployment. Miller is a member of the
House Unmanned Systems Caucus, which works to increase drone use and open US
airspace to UAVs.
Over
the past few years, Texas Republicans - most prominently Gov. Rick Perry, Sen. John Cornyn,
and Congressman Michael McCaul - have been the among the leading high-profile
proponents of drones for border security. Democratic Party politicians also
generally share the mounting enthusiasm in Congress for this high-tech fix for
border security.
Neither
the high price tag for the Predator and Reaper drones - $20 million apiece -
nor the inability of CBP to offer any substantive documentation of their
successful deployment deters Congressional drone boosters.
In
support of the department's use of drones for border security, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) officials routinely assert that drones are a
"force multiplier" and that UAVs form an essential part of the
"technological pillar" of border security. Congressional drone boosters
commonly echo and amplify these DHS claims.
Yet,
DHS assertions about the success, value and worth of drones in border security
operations suffer a widening credibility gap six years after Predator drones
first started patrolling the southwest border. UAVs may, as Miller states, be
fantastic technology.
The
purported achievements fall more into the realm of pure fantasy.
DHS has
steadily expanded its drone fleet, and Congress has offered more cheerleading
for drones than oversight. Due diligence and accountability are nowhere to be
found.
What
makes this absence of proper oversight and good management especially shocking
is that the waste, inefficiency and strategic blunders of the drone escalation
mirror the monumental failures of the SBInet "virtual fence" project
- the other major DHS venture into high-tech border security.
CBP,
which has eight drones in its UAV fleet with another two projected to be
delivered by early 2012, projects a 24-drone fleet according to its strategic
plan. Congressional members, alarmed about an array of perceived border
threats, have pressured CBP to quickly increase its drone fleet and patrol
areas despite CBP acknowledgements that it lacks the capacity and personnel to
deploy the drones it already has.
Multiplying
the Border Force
Since
the inclusion in 2003 of immigration and border security agencies within the
DHS, CBP has increasingly adopted a military lexicon to describe its
operations. That makes sense since, for the first time, CBP had an explicit
security mission - as evident in the wholesale adoption of the term
"border security."
Over
the past six years, CBP has spent more than $2 billion to create a
"technological pillar" for border security. The other two border
security pillars are personnel (Border Patrol and CBP agents) and
infrastructure (mainly the border fence).
The two
main components of CBP's new technological border security are the
"virtual fence" project (first known as SBInet and now called the
Alternative Technology Plan) and UAVs. In both cases, one from the ground and
the other from the air, surveillance technology monitors stretches of the
border and intelligence analysts attempt to determine if the received data
includes evidence of illegal border crossings.
In both
cases, CBP promotes these high-tech surveillance programs as "force
multipliers." That's a Department of Defense term meaning a
"capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force,
significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances
the probability of successful mission accomplishment." The claim, then, is
that UAVs increase the capability of the Border Patrol by increasing the
effective scope of their patrols. The ostensible logic of the force-multiplying
effect of UAVs is persuasive, just as the CBP assertion that the virtual fence
functions as a force multiplier has been presented as common sense - that
technology enhances productivity.
One
problem with the force-multiplier argument for border drone deployment is that
DHS has never provided any data to support the assertion. The other main
problem is that DHS probably cannot supply this supporting data because it is
simply not true. UAVs might be better described as being manpower-intensive
rather than force multipliers. At any time, it is more likely that CBP drones
are sitting on US military bases along the border rather than serving as the
Border Patrol's "eyes in the skies."
Why is
that? Numerous reasons. Bad weather, including cloudy conditions and winds, is
a common explanation. Another is that CBP and its Office of Air and Marine
(OAM) lacks the personnel to operate the drones.
Attempting
to explain why it is so challenging to get drones in the air, General
Kostelnik, who as OAM chief directs CBP's drone program, expressed his
frustration with preconceived notions about the unmanned character of UAVs:
We're
not flying to the full potential, not because of aircraft or airspace
limitations, but because we're still building the force. We're still growing
the crews....
We are
all here talking about unmanned. The real issues have nothing to do with the
unmanned part. The real issues are all about the manned piece, and this is a
manpower-intensive system.
The
manpower-intensive character of UAVs, observed Kostelnik, is especially true
for "the remotely piloted ones like the Predator." As the retired
general explained, the Predators require two pilots for any one mission, but
also large teams to handle launching and grounding. The manpower crunch
obstructing more Predator patrols is also due to all the analysts required to
do the "intel kind of things" with the steady stream of images
transmitted by the drones.
Despite
all the emphasis by CBP on the force-multiplying advantages of UAVs, neither
Kostelnik nor anyone else at CBP has offered any public description of exactly
how much "manpower" drone missions require.
Although
UAVs have the capability of flying as much as 20 hours, most missions
apparently average about ten hours, while the many training missions are still shorter.
During
the same subcommittee meeting, Kostelnik was asked to give members some idea of
the number of crew members required for a drone mission. According to
Kostelnik, a typical drone mission requires three crews in addition to the two
pilots - one handling navigation and the other directing the sensors - to
handle launching, landing, and recovery.
But
what makes UAV missions so "manpower-intensive" is the data
management and analysis associated with the stream of images flowing into the
control centers. "Taking the data takes more people," explained
Kostelnik, and the "data that comes out of our aircraft is now sent to
processing, exportation, and dissemination cells."
This
complex data input component of UAV surveillance is what Kostelnik, using
military jargon, called a "distributed infrastructure" that
complements the command control centers on military bases where the pilots and
aviation crews work. Another five full-time people are necessary, noted
Kostelnik, to "tell the sensor operator where to look and the pilot where
to fly."
The OAM
chief estimates that there could be 50 people involved in a typical drone
mission.
Without
even taking into account the number of Border Patrol agents deployed in planes,
helicopters and ground vehicles, the OAM chief estimated that UAVs depend on
teams of 50 or more. Counting those agents that hunt down suspected illegal
border crossers, it's likely that more than 100 Border Patrol agents and other
support staff would be involved in any one UAV surveillance incident.
Although
CBP officials have repeatedly testified in Congress about the progress and
success of the drone program, the CBP has not produced any hard information
about the numbers of men and women involved in a typical UAV-driven border
arrest or drug seizure.
Drones
may be, as Congressman Miller says, a "fantastic technology." But
that doesn't mean that they are a "force multiplier" as DHS
repeatedly asserts.
Even if
DHS could demonstrate that the Predators reduce the number of Border Patrol
agents needed to effectively patrol US borders, the DHS should still be
required to justify the $20 million it spends for a Predator and its control
system. If it were a responsible steward of government revenues, it should
provide data showing that drone surveillance is at least as effective as
surveillance by manned light aircraft or by Border Patrol officers on the
ground.
Yet,
none of the numerous Congressional DHS oversight committees have demanded such
an accounting from DHS and CBP, and DHS has ramped up the border drone program
without undertaking such a cost-benefit evaluation.
One
reason for this lack of due diligence is the boyish enthusiasm in Congress and
among border politicians for this new technological toy in their border
security playground.
Reporting
for The Washington
Post, William Booth brought attention to this uncritical drone
boosterism.
"In
his trips to testify on Capitol Hill," wrote Booth, "Michael
Kostelnik, the retired Air Force general and former test pilot who runs the
Office of Air and Marine for the CBP, said he has never been challenged in
Congress about the appropriate use of domestic drones. "Instead, the
question is: 'Why can't we have more of them in my district?' Kostelnik
said."
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