Mission Creep in Homeland Security Drone Program

(Excerpted from a new investigative report published by CounterPunch magazine, March 2013).

Tom Barry

Drones are proliferating—in overseas military operations, CIA clandestine missions, border security surveillance, domestic law enforcement, natural emergency responses, and overseas drug-interdiction. As drones proliferate, the lines that once constitutionally and legally separated national security, drug control, and domestic law enforcement are fading.

Technological advances require change and adaptations. As a type of new technological species that has suddenly appeared in our midst, it’s no surprise that society and government are playing catch up. Different drone breeds and hybrids are spreading around the globe and at home.

Meanwhile, citizen advocates, rights groups, and political leaders hurry behind, frantically calling for new regularly frameworks to gain a measure of control over drone proliferation.

Drones are proliferating so rapidly that there is still no commonly accepted formal name for the new species—which are formally classified, variously, as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Aerial Systems (US, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs), or simply Unmanned Systems.

Whether they are aerial, ground, or aquatic robotic systems, drones mark the latest species in a continuum in development of weapons and spying systems.

The model names given by their military contractors reflect their threat to other species, notably humans. Looking down on us and sometimes striking are Predators, Global Hawks, Hunters, and Scan Eagles. In contrast, the names of other smaller breeds—Killer Bees, Dragon Flies, Wasps,

Moths, Tarantulas, etc.—indicate how close and pesky other drone species can be.

Not all drones are baptized with the names from the natural world. Some bear more traditionally militaristic and mythical tags, like the Reapers, Avengers, Hunters, Dragon Eyes, Guardians, and Sentinels.

Seeking to communicate their new high-tech power

and possibilities, drone manufacturers and their government buyers reach to myths and the gods for their handles: Hermes, Pegasus, Gorgon Stare, and Vampire.

The main distinctive feature of the drone species is that they are unmanned craft. Yet drones are often armed and dangerous—some with Hellfire or the lighter-weight Griffin missiles, while others that specialize in law enforcement can zoom in with Tasers. In conflict zones, they prey on targets, searching, hunting, and destroying. Other predator drone species, like those that patrol our borders, are also on the hunt—for immigrants and drugs.

The military and intelligence sectors of Israel and the United States have—in close collaboration with military contractors—been the leading drone breeders, although scores of other major and small powers are also breeding and deploying drones. Historically, drones have been deployed primarily on national security missions—both in direct war-fighting as “hunter-killers,” or on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions.

The declaration by President George W. Bush on 20 September 2001 of a global “crusade” in the form of a “war on terrorism” set off drone proliferation, although the US Air Force and intelligence sector had been developing Predator drones for ISR missions since the early 1990s and for targeted killings since the late 1990s.

Following closely behind the government-sponsored development of Predator drones for military missions has been the use of Predators and Predator variants for homeland security missions. Soon after the opening of the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003, General Atomics began collaborating with the DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to deploy unarmed Predators for Border Security.

Immediately following ten days in October 2003 of demonstration flights in Arizona, CBP signed its first in a series of sole-source contracts with General Atomics.

Drone strikes and ISR operations were part of what the Pentagon and CIA called the “Global War on Terror.” President Obama called an end to that war in March 2009, but the drone strikes and other clandestine operations march on as part of what this administration calls “Overseas Contingency Operations.”

Predator Drones Join Air National Guard in Many States

(Excerpted from a new investigative report, “Blind Faith in Drones,”  by Tom Barry published by CounterPunch magazine, March 2013).

The expansive vision for DHS drones—linking of border security, homeland security, public safety, and national security—is paralleled by the rapid integration of Predator drones into the state-level Air National Guard units.

Testifying in Congress in 2006, Thomas Cassidy, founder and executive director of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, briefed senators on the range of Predator deployments—from overseas war-fighting missions (involving 70 General Atomics contract pilots and crew) to border security missions to the rapid integration of Predators into the state-based Air National Guard units.

According to Cassidy, “The US Air Force is standing up 15 new Air National Guard Predator and Predator B squadrons throughout the United States. These aircraft must fly where they are needed, which may include border protection missions. But they will be operating in probably 12 different states.”

The procurement of Predators by National Guard units since 2005 occurred with no public debate or congressional discussion—and no media coverage.

Unlike the Air Force reserve units, the Air Force guard units are operational mostly within the United State in response to orders by state governors and occasionally with direct Pentagon support for domestic missions. This integration of Predator drones into Air National Guard units across the country has not been accompanied by the issuance of enforceable guidelines and restrictions to protect the privacy and civil rights of US residents whose activities are recorded in Predator video streams.

According to the National Guard Bureau, the Air Guard currently includes seven states with UAV units, including California, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Nevada and Arizona, with an eighth state in the process of including a drone unit. Budget cuts at DOD and by state governments have resulted in the closure and shrinking of many state-based Air Guard units.

However, an increasing number of the Air National Guard units (as distinct from Air Force reserves) that remain active are downsizing their fighter planes and adding UAV units, mainly Predator drones. As manned aircraft age and retire, the Air Guard units with UAVs could soon double to 15 or 16, according to National Guard officials, especially as Predators and other UAVs are increasingly brought home from war-fighting missions abroad.

Photo: Occasion of new Predator purchase at General Atomics production facility in Poway, Califorinia  , with former GA founder and CEO Thomas Cassidy presiding.

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Homeland Security Drones Mission Creep from Border Security to National Security

(Excerpted from a new investigative report published by CounterPunch magazine, March 2013).

Tom Barry

CBP states its drone program is made up of the “leading edge of border security technology.” What is more, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM) boasts that its homeland security drone program is also on the leading edge of “shaping the US policy debate” and constitutes “the leading edge deployment of US in the national airspace.”

It’s no idle boast. The DHS fleet of seven Predators and three Guardians (a marine-surveillance variant of the Predator developed for CBP by General Atomics) stand at the vanguard of drone deployment for domestic ISR missions, and DHS has provided grants to local law enforcement agencies to acquire small UAVs while also pushing the Federal Aviation Administration to open national airspace to CBP drones.

Since 2004, when CBP first started using these unmanned flying machines, CBP has steadily expanded the scope of its mission for drones. First, the Predators were deployed for “border security” on the US-Mexico border, but congressional members from Michigan and North Dakota successfully pressured DHS to deploy Predators to “secure the northern border.”

With its three Guardians, CBP/OAM has again reached beyond the land borders to join the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the US Northern and Southern Commands to engage in drug interdiction operations throughout the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Pacific. What were initially considered to be instruments of “border security” have become fully engaged in the war on drugs. (The Obama administration also declared an end to the “war on drugs,” transitioning in 2011 to what the White House calls the “Combat against Transnational Criminal Organizations.)

The mission creep of homeland security drones is a department-wide problem arising in large part from the lack of any coherent definition of the term “homeland security.” Similarly, DHS has never bothered to define what it means by “border security.” Nor does CBP have “performance measures” to evaluate its progress in securing the border—and in the case of the homeland security drones to evaluate their effectiveness.

Most of the concern about the domestic deployment of drones by DHS has focused on the crossover to law-enforcement that threaten privacy and civil rights—and without more regulations in place will accelerate the transition to what critics call a “surveillance society.” Also worth public attention and congressional review is the increasing interface between border drones and national security and military operations.

The prevalence of military jargon used by CBP officials—such as “defense in depth” and “situational awareness”—points to at least a rhetorical overlapping of border control and military strategy. Another sign of the increasing coincidence between CBP/OAM drone program and the military is that the commanders and deputies of OAM are retired military officers.

The vague concepts of homeland security and border security facilitate the creep of the CBP/OAM drone program. Nothing appears off-limits as to how these Predators and Guardians may be used at home or in the “near abroad”—in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America.

In a presentation to the National Defense Industrial Association in October 2012, OAM chief Michael Kostelnik explained other ways in which the “US are the leading edge of homeland security.” As these “US operations continue to expand and mature,” the homeland security drone program is providing “rapid contingency deployment supports” for “federal/state/local missions.” What is more, the “CBP US deployment vision strengthens national security response capability.”

Michael Kostelnik, who DHS hired in 2005 to direct OAM, rose to the rank of Major General in the US Air Force, and as director of the Air—had a direct role in Air Force’s central role in developing the Predator and then arming it with Hellfire missiles. So, it is easy to understand how the retired Major General—who left OAM in December 2012— regarded the US program he directed as the leading edge in the integration of homeland security, border security, public safety, and national security.

Typical of his big picture concept of homeland security, Kostelnik told the Defense Systems Journal that OAM had the most advanced USfleet operators who could, at a moment’s notice, be “CHOP’ed”—Change in Operational Command—to military control.

In January 2013, CBP brought in another retired military officer to direct OAM. Like Kostelnik, Randolph Alles, the new OAM director, was also a point person for UAVs as a major general in the US Marine Corps.

Role of the Military in Domestic Drone Deployment

(Excerpted from a new investigative report published by CounterPunch magazine, March 2013).

Projected drone squadron locations for U.S. military drones, 2017 (DOD)

Tom Barry

The Department of Homland Security takes a broad view of the scope of drone operations. Yet DHS is not alone in breaking down the barriers that have traditionally—and constitutionally—separated domestic law enforcement and national security operations.

The Pentagon could easily dispute CBP’s contention that its UAV program represents the leading edge in the opening up the homeland to drones.

The Congressional Caucus on Unmanned Systems, which was founded in 2009 by Rep. Buck McKeon (R-Calif.), has encouraged the Pentagon to work with the Federal Aviation Agency to open national airspace to military and other UAVs.

Currently, military drones are restricted to defined military airspace around military bases, unless operating with special waivers or COAs (Certificates of Authorization) issued by the FAA. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), a leading member of the drone caucus, sponsored an amendment to the National Department of Defense Authorization Act of 2009 that authorized the creation of an interagency US Executive Committee under Pentagon sponsorship to increase drone access to national airspace.

“It is vital for DOD and the FAA to collaborate closely to achieve progress in gaining access for unmanned aerial systems to the National Airspace System to support military requirements,” stated the Hunter amendment to the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. With the Pentagon in the lead, the US Executive Committee aims to “enable increased and ultimately routine access of Federal UAVs engaged in public aircraft operations into the NAS to support operational, training, development, and research requirements of FAA, DOD, DHS, and NASA.”

In its Final Report to Congress on Access to National Airspace by Unmanned Aerial Systems (October 2010), the office of the Undersecretary of Defense noted that the Hunter amendment “recommended that the DOD and the FAA form an Executive Committee to act as a focal point for resolution of issues on matters of policy and procedures relating to US access to the National Airspace System (NAS).” Furthermore, “The sense of Congress was that progress has been lagging in the integration of US into the NAS for operational training, operational support to the Combatant Commanders, and support to domestic authorities in emergencies and natural disasters.”

The Pentagon has its own motivations for increasing UAV access to the national airspace, including expanding the airspace available for drone training operations. In addition to training, in its October 2010 report DOD set forth its objectives: the DOD needs to be able to respond rapidly to operational tasking, typically from a COCOM such as the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

Many of these tasked missions relate to homeland defense, homeland security, and defense support to civilian authorities. This includes border and port surveillance, maritime operations, counterdrug operations, and disaster or special event support.

The US military has an expanding UAV presence within the nation’s borders, and it is eager to expand the airspace available for training and other missions. The 2010 report of the newly created UAV Executive Committee reported that the Pentagon was projecting that the number of UAV units or squadrons based in the continental United States will increase to 197 in 2015 from 146 in 2009, while the number of bases where these units are stationed will increase 62%—from 63 to 105 bases.

The Pentagon insists that opening the national airspace to drones is essential to the “sustainability” of the continued development of the US military’s UAV capacity. In its April 2012 Report on Future Unmanned Aerial Systems Training, Operations, and Sustainability, the Pentagon clearly states its case and its strategy for complete access to national airspace by military UAVs: “This need for airspace access to test new systems, train operators, and conduct continental United States)-based missions has quickly exceeded the current airspace available for military operations. The situation will only be exacerbated as units return from overseas contingencies.”

According to DOD, “The end state will be routine NAS access comparable to manned aircraft for all DOD US operational, training, and support missions.” In its Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, the Pentagon insisted in “having robust US Airspace Integration capabilities for all classes of US airspace is fundamental to flexible worldwide US deployment.

How the Nation's Border Guardians Got Stuck in a Policy Conundrum, and How They Can Get Out

The U.S. Border Patrol recently released a new strategic plan – the third in its nine-decade history. Rather than clarifying the agency’s strategic focus, the new plan underscores the agency’s lack of strategic direction.

The previous strategic plan, published in 2004, stated ensuring “operational control” of the U.S. border as its primary objective. “Operational control” was defined as the ability of the Border Patrol to “detect, identify, classify, and then respond to and resolve illegal entries.” Facing intense criticism for their failure to ensure such security measures over large sections of the southwestern border, the Border Patrol released the 2012 – 2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan.

The agency issued its latest plan amid mounting criticism of its billion-dollar high-tech programs, excessive and cross-border violence, and continuing failure to provide performance and cost-benefit evaluations of its various new border security initiatives. While intended to put critics’ concerns over these problems to rest, the 2012 – 2016 Strategic Plan instead ignores them entirely.

Framed as a military-type strategy and replete with references to border risks and threats, the 2012-2016 plan fails to indicate on what grounds risks will be assessed, how risks will be evaluated, and how new spending will be determined. It fails to make even a single reference to its predecessor’s former goal of operational control or include any performance measures.

Nowhere to be found in the document is even the slightest hint of a commitment to make border security programs more transparent, accountable, and cost-effective.  This lack of transparency and accountability is a mounting problem that the Border Patrol has continued to ignore.

Criticism on All Sides 

Over the past several years, the U.S. Border Patrol has faced increasing and widespread criticism from all political factions. Some critics, particularly on the right, charge that the Border Patrol is not doing enough to “secure the border,” while those left-of-center lambaste the agency for abusing immigrants and intensifying a failing drug war. 

Perhaps the harshest criticism has come from the government’s own auditing agencies. The Government Accountability Office (GOA) has issued a series of scathing reports faulting the Border Patrol for mismanagement, waste, and lack of strategic focus. Despite the increasing disapproval, the Border Patrol has continued to benefit from a bipartisan consensus to “secure the border,” resulting in a doubling of funding for Border Patrol operations over the last ten years.

The Border Patrol is a division of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged with securing U.S. ports of entry (POEs) and the northern and southwestern land borders.  CBP is the largest DHS agency, receiving 21% (currently $11.5 billion) of its total funding. Over the last ten years, DHS has spent over $100 billion on border-security operations, yet the Border Patrol still struggles to formulate a practical and politically viable strategy to guide the spending of this new border security bonanza.

The term “border security” largely replaced references to “border control” in official statements following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003. The 2012 - 2016 Strategic Plan is the latest attempt to define the meaning of the term while formulating a strategy to guide border security operations.

CBP routinely explains its “border security” mission as obstructing the entry of “dangerous good and dangerous people,” and stations customs officers at land and coastal POEs, while Border Patrol agents patrol the land border between the POEs. However, the new strategy fails to alleviate any of the persistent concerns about the Border Patrol’s strategic focus and operational efficiency.

The GAO and leading congressional members concerned with border policy have expressed skepticism about the Border Patrol’s resolve and capacity to address concerns about cost-effectiveness and strategic focus, while faulting the agency for not including performance measures in its new plan. In an attempt to refute these concerns, acting CBP Commissioner David Aguilar said “the Strategic Plan sets a firm foundation for the continued evolution of the Border Patrol as an integral part of CBP’s overall border management and homeland security enterprise.”

Public Relations, Not Serious Strategy 

Though claiming to be both “risk-based” and “intelligence-driven,” the new plan includes no methodology for assessing risks or for leveraging intelligence to meet identified threats to homeland security. The Border Patrol also fails to explain – either in the new strategy or elsewhere – how risk-management will determine the directional focus and budgetary specifics of border funding.

The 2012 – 2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan is not a serious document. It includes repeated references to vague tactics such as rapid response, intelligence, community engagement, whole-of-government approaches, and inter-governmental integration. Full of platitudes, patriotisms, military jargon and abstractions, the strategy plan is essentially a public-relations statement. The “firm foundation” that CBP Chief Aguilar sees is manifestly flimsy and unprofessional. The Strategic Plan has no real plan, no timelines, no summary of the evolving geopolitical context for border control, no strategic focus, and no baselines or metrics to measure the Border Patrol’s progress in securing the border.

The Border Patrol’s Strategic Muddle describes the agency’s policy conundrum and chronicles how the Border Patrol got stuck in its current strategic mess. The report offers common-sense prescriptions for extricating the agency from this muddle and offers recommendations for setting new directions.Key 

Findings

As the nation transitions away from its post-9/11 fears and wars, U.S. border strategy needs to be overhauled and updated. A new strategy for border control should be closely linked to a penetrating review of counterterrorism, the drug war, and immigration policies.

The time is auspicious for such a revision. New budgetary and debt concerns, escalating critiques of immensely expensive and shamefully ineffective border security programs, and expanding critiques of the drug war have opened up new political space.

Recommendations for new strategic directions for the Border Patrol include the following:

* DHS must define what it means by “border security,” and the Border Patrol must go back to the drawing board to formulate a more comprehensive and cogent strategy, along with closely linked performance measures.

* The Border Patrol must demonstrate that its “metrics” are indeed based on closely considered threat assessments and risk-management processes. As part of its strategic plan, the agency must do the following: categorize risks and threats, prioritize them, justify this prioritization, mount programs to target these prioritized threats, and establish a methodology to measure performance.

* The Border Patrol should immediately desist in making escalated threat assessments about illegal drugs and drug-smuggling operations. The crossing of illegal drugs has long characterized the border and will continue to do so as long as there is a U.S. market for these substances.

* Administratively, DHS could, and should, mandate that the Border Patrol end what is, in effect, its strategic focus on the marijuana drug war. Marijuana is not a security threat, and there is mounting momentum for its legalization or decriminalization on both sides of the border. Nearly 95% of the Border Patrol’s drug war activities involve marijuana.

* As part of its stated determination to pursue risk-based border protection, the Border Patrol should deprioritize immigration enforcement. A credible risk-management process cannot justify operations that make no distinction between truly dangerous individuals and ordinary immigrants seeking work and family reunification. The Border Patrol should instead target border bandits who prey upon vulnerable immigrants and smugglers of truly dangerous illegal and prescription drugs.

* The Border Patrol must respond to GAO recommendations that the agency undertake serious cost-benefit evaluations of each programmatic component of its border security operations. Congress and the U.S. public deserve to know in detail the costs and associated benefits of multimillion-dollar expenditures on each of the various tactical infrastructure and high-tech projects.

* The Border Patrol must establish transparent procedures that will allow Congress, government auditors, and the public to evaluate the effectiveness of its many new operations and initiatives in successfully targeting the threats to the homeland on what the Border Patrol calls “America’s frontline.”

To read the complete Border Patrol’s Strategic Muddle report, including references, please visit: http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/border-patrol-strategic-muddle